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WHO IS THE WITNESS TO AN INTERNET CRIME: 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, DIGITAL 
FORENSICS, AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Merritt Baer† 
The ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is part of it.  
Far from being divided between them as between two poles which 
mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding 
to the other . . . [T]hese conflicts which break forth are not 
between the ideal and reality, but between two ideals, that of 
yesterday and that of to-day. 
—Jurgen Habermas
1
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
accused the right to confront witnesses against him.  In this article I 
examine child pornography prosecution, in which we must apply this 
constitutional standard to digital forensic evidence.  I ask, “Who is 
the witness to an Internet crime?” 
The Confrontation Clause proscribes the admission of hearsay. 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court stated that the primary 
concern was reliability and that hearsay might be admissible if the 
reliability concerns were assuaged. Twenty-four years later, in 
Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court repositioned the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as a procedural right. 
Even given assurances of reliability, “testimonial” evidence requires 
a physical witness. 
This witness production requirement could have been sensible in 
an era when actions were physically tied to humans. But in an 
 
 †  Merritt Baer is a Colorado native, a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law 
School. She has worked in cyber law and policy in all three branches of government and runs a 
cyber consulting company: www.merrittrachelbaer.com.  She would like to thank her family for 
fostering an adventurousness that led her to embrace technology questions, and in particular to 
her grandmother Nancy Van Buren. 
 1. 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND 
SYSTEM 71 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 3d ed. 1989). 
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Internet age, actions may take place at degrees removed from any 
physical person. 
The hunt for a witness to digital forensic evidence involved in 
child pornography prosecution winds through a series of law 
enforcement protocols, on an architecture owned and operated by 
private companies. Sentencing frameworks associated with child 
pornography similarly fail to reflect awareness of the way that 
actions occur online, even while they reinforce what is at stake. 
The tensions I point to in this article are emblematic of emerging 
questions in Internet law. I show that failing to link the application of 
law and its undergirding principles to a digital world does not escape 
the issue, but distorts it. This failure increases the risk that our efforts 
to preserve Constitutional rights are perverted or made impotent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I argue that as digital information becomes more 
prolific and data gathering operates yet more independently of human 
control, we will need to reconsider the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause rights.  The Court has attempted to untangle 
Confrontation Clause implications in the areas of lab forensics, 
including urinalysis results and DNA testing.
2
  However, child 
pornography prosecution represents a new manifestation of 
constitutional questions regarding digital forensic evidence, and as an 
Internet crime, it forms a case study for the difficulty in applying 
constitutional case law to Internet evidence.
3
  Child pornography 
prosecution involves fairly traditional business records collected in 
the ordinary course of Internet business, and it also includes data 
collected or aggregated in response to a reported suspicion of 
criminality.  Specific questions arising from these forms of digitized, 
aggregated evidence prompt broad questions—Who is the witness to 
an Internet crime?  How is that witness to be examined?  Ultimately, 
how do we preserve the guarantees of process that foster a sense of 
justice in trials? 
I begin in Part I with a general review of developments leading 
to the current landscape of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause protections, including factors informing determinations of 
what is testimonial and what it means to require confrontation of a 
witness.  In Part II, I offer examples in current case law involving 
forensic evidence and the Confrontation Clause, which has been in 
urinalysis cases and the use of DNA evidence.  In Part III, I delve into 
the fairly new questions raised by the use of Internet records in child 
pornography prosecution, looking at the First Circuit’s holding in 
United States v. Cameron in particular.
4
  Finally, in Part IV, I explore 
 
 2. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (involving 
urinalysis reports); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (involving DNA evidence). 
 3. Recognized, that many in the community seeking to address child sexual abuse do not 
find the term child pornography appropriate because of the possibility that it normalizes the 
sexual abuse by categorizing it in terms applied to adult pornography.  However, since the 
statutory language refers to this category of illegal images as child pornography, I too use this 
terminology.  See Memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, (Jan. 1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02467.htm (“Prior to the 
enactment of the Act . . . [t]he term ‘child pornography,’ was only a lay term and not a term of 
art. The Act, however, amends [S]ection 2256 and uses the term ‘child pornography’ . . . .”)  
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 4. United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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some of the broader questions that the transition to digital records 
raises and I argue that we need to make a decision as to the intent and 
therefore the substance of the Confrontation Clause in the context of 
digital evidence. 
I. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A. The Confrontation Clause: General Background 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees, 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”5  That is, it 
proscribes the admission of hearsay statements.
6
  The Supreme Court 
clarified that the right is one of “face-to-face” confrontation.7 
Despite the blanket phrasing of the Confrontation Clause’s 
guarantee, the Supreme Court recognized explicitly as early as 1895 
that the right of confrontation is “subject to exceptions, recognized 
long before the adoption of the Constitution.”8  In Mattox, the Court 
upheld the use of testimony at a second trial when the witness had 
died after testifying in the first trial, explaining that “A technical 
adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally 
be carried further than is necessary to the just protection of the 
accused, and further than the safety of the public will warrant.”9  
Accordingly, the rules of evidence recognize a number of exceptions 
to the prohibition on hearsay.  In this section I explore the trajectory 
of the Court’s definitions as to what evidence the Confrontation 
Clause’s prohibition on hearsay does or does not reach. 
B. What Triggers Confrontation Clause Protections? 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court established that the 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (The Clause was incorporated to states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied to states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
 6. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011) (hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted). 
 7. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citation omitted).  This right, however, is 
not absolute.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (the Sixth Amendment does not 
categorically prohibit a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant 
outside of the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television). 
 8. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 9. Id. at 243. 
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primary concern surrounding hearsay evidence was reliability.
10
  
However, even absent the cross-examination provided by the 
Confrontation Clause as a safeguard of reliability, hearsay might be 
admissible nevertheless, over a Confrontation Clause objection, if it 
met sufficient “indicia of reliability.”11  This included evidence 
admitted under a “firmly rooted exception” to the hearsay rule,12 but 
could also apply if the party presenting the evidence could meet the 
standard of showing “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”13 
A few decades later, Crawford v. Washington reconceived both 
the reasoning behind the admissibility of certain hearsay statements, 
and the criteria for determining those statements that might form 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s particularized protection.14  
The Court rejected reliability as the basis for the analytical framework 
and instead postured the Clause as a procedural right.  Rather than 
merely existing as one form of guarantee as to the reliability of 
hearsay evidence, the Crawford Court held that the purpose of the 
Clause is to guarantee the accused the opportunity to confront 
accusers whose statements are the result of government efforts to 
gather evidence for prosecution.
15
 
 
 10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  In White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas termed 
cross-examination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”  502 U. S. 
346, 361-63 (1992) (citation omitted) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment, noting that this rule applies even if the confession is “found to be reliable”).  Note 
that in White, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) voiced originalist concerns, 502 U.S. 
346, 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), that would later manifest in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the majority in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 11. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66. 
 12. Id.  See also FED. R. EVID. 803, 804(b); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) 
(permitting the spontaneous declaration and medical treatment exceptions); United States v. 
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (hearsay exceptions include the co-conspirator exception to the 
hearsay prohibition).  The Court did not include the statements made by a 2-year-old girl in 
Idaho v. Wright regarding abuse by her mother and mother’s boyfriend.  497 U.S. 805 (1990).  
Because the statements were not made spontaneously or to obtain medical treatment, and 
particularly in light of the interviewer’s suggestive interview technique, the Court held that the 
statements by the young girl did not fall into one of the recognized exceptions and lacked 
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness.  Id. at 827.  Particularly before Crawford v. Washington, 
the Court acknowledged that these “firmly rooted exceptions” still included a judgment on the 
reliability of the statements: “Established practice, in short, must confirm that statements falling 
within a category of hearsay inherently ‘carr[y] special guarantees of credibility’ essentially 
equivalent to, or greater than, those produced by the Constitution’s preference for cross-
examined trial testimony.”  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (citation omitted). 
 13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 15. See id. at 55-56 (opportunity for cross-examination is “dispositive, and not merely 
one of several ways to establish reliability.”). 
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia referenced the trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh in 1603.  Raleigh was sentenced to death based on Lord 
Cobham’s statements to the Privy Council, without opportunity for 
cross-examination.  Justice Scalia concluded, “[t]he constitutional 
text, like the history underlying the common-law right of 
confrontation . . . reflects an especially acute concern with a specific 
type of out-of-court statement,”16—and these are “testimonial” 
statements. 
C. What is Testimonial? 
Crawford therefore established as the crux of admissibility the 
question of whether a statement is testimonial; testimonial statements 
are inadmissible until and unless the Confrontation Clause can be 
satisfied.  How to determine what is testimonial remained unclear.  
Crawford listed three categories that would qualify as testimonial 
statements, the third and most expansive of which is, “statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.”17  The hearsay at issue in Crawford was 
certainly testimonial, as it was a statement made during police 
interrogation. 
In companion cases Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. 
Indiana
18
 the Court attempted to define further what is testimonial: 
statements are non-testimonial (admissible without raising 
Confrontation Clause objection) “when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.”19  Meanwhile, statements made during 
police questioning are testimonial (raising Confrontation Clause 
objection) when “the circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
 
 16. Id. at 51. 
 17. Id. at 52.  The first two categories are: (1) “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,” (2) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially.”  Id. 
 18. Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 1213 (2006); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006) (the Court heard Davis and Hammon in tandem). 
 19. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
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events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”20  Based on 
this distinction, the statements in Davis (a victim telling a 911 
operator that Davis, the accused, was beating her) were non-
testimonial as they described ongoing events, while the statement in 
Hammon was testimonial and triggered Confrontation Clause 
protection because it “took place some time after the events described 
were over,” thus its primary purpose was to prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
21
 
The Crawford opinion did not clearly define “testimonial.”22  It 
laid out a number of situational factors that may enter into a 
determination of whether a statement is testimonial.  While formality 
is “essential” to a testimonial utterance, “interrogation” is not 
essential to formality.
23
 
Statements to someone other than a government employee in the 
course of an investigation are much less likely to be testimonial
24—
though the Court also accepted that the 911 operator in Davis was 
committing “acts of the police.”25 
Indicia of “solemnity”26 may be relevant, reinforced by the fact 
that making false statements to a government official is usually a 
crime.  The Crawford Court affirmed that statements made to a co-
conspirator turned FBI informant in Bourjaily v. United States were 
non-testimonial.
27
 
Crawford also outlined exceptions in which testimonial hearsay 
is nevertheless admissible: (1) when the declarant was subjected to 
cross-examination at the time of the statement and is unavailable for 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 830 (the Court further clarified that statements might evolve from non-
testimonial to testimonial as the urgency of the situation changed, implying that the primary 
purpose had changed from emergency assistance to evidence collection). 
 22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted) (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justice O’Connor, expressed as much in his concurrence, stating, “[T]he thousands of federal 
prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the 
specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the Court lists is now covered by the new rule.”). 
 23. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 823 (the Court maintained, “[T]he Framers were no more 
willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended 
question than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”). 
 24. For instance, in Crawford, the Court reexamined the statements from the victim to the 
police officer in White v. Illinois, even though the victim made identical statements to her 
babysitter, mother, and a nurse and doctor; presumably, the focus was on statements made to 
law enforcement because the others were nontestimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. 
 25. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
 26. Id. at 836-37, 840. 
 27. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. 
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cross-examination despite diligent efforts of the prosecution;
28
 (2) 
where the declarant is unavailable because of misconduct by the 
defendant;
29
 (3) where the defendant has opportunity at trial to cross-
examine the declarant;
30
 (4) where the statements were not offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted.
31
 
D. What Is a Witness? 
While some legal scholars anticipated challenges arising out of 
forensic lab reports or other types of potentially-testimonial records,
32
 
the Crawford Court did not address the application of the (post-
Crawford) Confrontation Clause to medical, business or other types 
of records.  Case law was ad hoc
33
 until 2009, when the Court applied 
the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.
34
 
Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested making a cocaine sale in a 
Kmart parking lot in Massachusetts.  At trial, the prosecution 
introduced bags of the cocaine he was distributing as well as drug 
analysis certificates prepared by a lab technician who had analyzed 
the drugs and identified them as cocaine.
35
  In a contested 5-4 
decision, the Melendez-Diaz Court held that introduction of forensic 
evidence in the form of lab reports is testimonial.  Rejecting 
contentions that lab reports are non-testimonial business records 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), or that they are not 
accusatory because they contain scientific data, Justice Scalia wrote 
for the majority that toxicology reports “are incontrovertibly ‘a 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.’”36 
 
. 28. Id. at 54-69. 
 29. Id. at 61-62; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 30. See id. 
 31. This is the basic threshold for the definition of hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011). 
 32. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 452 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (warrants of deportation 
signed by an immigration official are not testimonial); United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 
(6th Cir. 2005) (business records are not testimonial); State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 377 
n.1 (N.D. 2006) (surveying differing judicial views on whether lab reports are testimonial). 
 34. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 35. Id. at 308. 
 36. Id. at 310 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). It is interesting to note that the military 
jurisprudence regarding Confrontation Clause triggers in urinalysis cases involves different 
factors.  While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held consistent with 
Melendez-Diaz, there are a number of military-specific circumstances that affect the 
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The Melendez-Diaz majority characterized their determination to 
be “little more than the application of our holding in Crawford v. 
Washington.”37  This dismissal seems disingenuous; the holding in 
Melendez-Diaz necessarily included a number of determinations. 
For one, the Melendez-Diaz holding implied a judgment about 
what a witness could be—without a witness to call to the stand, the 
text of the Confrontation Clause is nonsensical or inapplicable. The 
Melendez-Diaz Court held that Melendez-Diaz’s Confrontation 
Clause rights were violated when the prosecution introduced over his 
objection “certificates of state laboratory analysts” that identified 
cocaine at his state-court drug trial.  The determination seems to have 
revolved around the posture of the evidence at issue—the fact that the 
certificates consisted of evidence “against him,” and Justice Scalia 
specifically pointed to the language of the Confrontation Clause’s 
guarantee.
38
 
Justice Scalia wrote, “To the extent the analysts were witnesses. . 
.they certainly provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact 
necessary for his conviction—that the substance he possessed was 
cocaine.”39  Since the level of alertness or sleepiness of the lab 
technicians was never introduced as a factor in Melendez-Diaz, it 
seems fair to assume that one can be considered a witness even when 
mindlessly collecting information as part of one’s job. Is there a 
consciousness requirement in witnessing, and if not, where is the 
distinct line between that information captured by a machine—or the 
Internet—and that information which has a human component?40  
 
determination.  Unlike civilian contexts, military urinalysis is performed routinely, not only in 
the context of an investigation; the samples are identified only by social security number rather 
than name; and there is presumably less risk of a forensic analyst “responding to a request from 
a law enforcement official [feeling] pressure—or [i]ncentive—to alter the evidence in a manner 
favorable to the prosecution.”  Id. at 318; see, e.g., United States v. Blazier, 68 M.J. 439, 444 
(C.A.A.F. 2010). 
 37. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327. 
 38. Id. at 314. 
 39. Id. at 313. 
 40. The Eleventh Circuit has held explicitly that “[i]n light of the constitutional text and 
the historical focus of the Confrontation Clause, we are persuaded that the witnesses with whom 
the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses.”  United States v. Lamons, 532 
F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).  See also United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003); 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 380, at 65 (2d ed. 1994) (“[N]othing ‘said’ by a 
machine . . . is hearsay”).  However, the qualities of machines are becoming more blurred as 
evidence produced through a human-derived process such as software may have the qualities of 
a human-generated document without any action that directly involves human hands. 
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Ought we to consider as witness the hardware or software engineer if 
that hardware or software was later involved in data collection or 
analysis that produced damning evidence?
41
  The Court seems to have 
asserted a right to call a witness without fully considering whom that 
witness will be in cases that involve digital forensic evidence. 
E. Post-Melendez-Diaz Forensic Evidence 
In the years following Melendez-Diaz and the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to toxicology reports, the Supreme Court 
applied post-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to other 
forms of forensic evidence, including blood alcohol level results in 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
42
 and DNA evidence in Williams v. 
Illinois.
43
  In both of these cases, the evidence itself was collected in 
the course of an investigation that included the possibility of later 
prosecution.  Like Melendez-Diaz, they involved unfavorable 
evidence in the form of forensic test results produced by a machine 
and certified by a person. 
In Bullcoming, as in Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that 
introduction of the evidence over a Confrontation Clause exception 
violated the petitioner’s right to confront witnesses against him.44  In 
Williams, the Court held that an expert witness could testify as to 
“others’ testimonial statements if those statements are not themselves 
admitted as evidence.”45  Thus, the Court made the dubious claim that 
the inadmissibility of the underlying testimonial evidence could be 
isolated from the expert’s reliance upon them and escaped the 
question for the time by hinging the holding on expert witness law 
rather than a testimonial-ness determination. 
Child pornography forces us to re-confront and reevaluate the 
Confrontation Clause questions that arose in these recent cases, and it 
also raises new ones.  Child pornography possession or distribution 
cases force the issue because the evidence in a child pornography 
 
 41. In a recent child pornography appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that an accused has the 
right to inspect software used to prosecute him if “functions of the program were relevant to his 
defense,” rather than to accept the FBI’s affidavits of how the filesharing program works.  
United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).  The movement toward 
increasingly particularized levels of forensic evidence in e-discovery seems tied to a general 
reconsideration of the level of relevance that courts view in software and hardware 
characteristics to cybercrime cases. 
 42. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 43. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. 
 44. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716. 
 45. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223. 
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prosecution consists of a range of evidence types, most of which 
include business records in the colloquial sense but many of which 
are not business records that meet the legal standard of the evidentiary 
exemption.  These range from digital data collected routinely in the 
course of business and without targeting a particular user, to digital 
evidence collected, labeled, and assembled in preparation for 
prosecution.  The first seems to be textbook business record 
exception; the second sounds like testimonial evidence that triggers a 
Confrontation Clause right. In practice, drawing the line between the 
two is not so clear, and the determinations raise fundamental 
questions that will apply to digital evidence standards more broadly. 
II. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTION COMPELS US TO 
REEXAMINE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
A. Child Pornography Is Cyber Crime 
As the days of back-alley or mail-order exchanges of child 
pornography
46
 photographs in paper bags are largely over, child 
pornography today is an area of cyber crime, and its enforcement 
relies upon digital forensic data as evidence.
47
  I take it as an example 
because of the range of Internet data that is necessarily involved in a 
child pornography prosecution, particularly in child pornography 
possession or distribution cases. 
Child pornography is a unique area of First Amendment 
jurisprudence: the Supreme Court has held since 1982 that 
constitutional speech protections do not apply to child pornography, 
even when the material does not meet the obscenity test outlined in 
Miller.
48
  The rationales for criminalizing child pornography are 
distinct.  In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that the 
state’s interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors is a 
compelling “government objective of surpassing importance,” and the 
law in question carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, 
physical, and sexual abuse associated with child pornography, thus its 
proscription of child pornography did not violate the First 
 
 46. The legal definition of the term “child pornography” can be found in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, Child Pornography on the Internet, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV. (May 2006), 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e04062000.pdf (last updated May 2012). 
 48. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Amendment.
49
 
While the precedent for criminalizing child pornography is well 
established since Ferber in 1982, child pornography jurisprudence 
encapsulates many of the dilemmas of applying constitutional law 
online.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, it results in a significant number of 
appeals—one researcher noted that “[a]lmost 70 percent of all 
reported appellate decisions involving the search or seizure of digital 
evidence are concerned with the recovery of child pornography.”50  In 
the United States, child pornography possession, distribution, and 
receipt are prosecuted through 18 U.S.C. Section 2252,
51
 “Certain 
activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of 
minors,” and Section 2252A, “Certain activities relating to material 
constituting or containing child pornography.”52 Federal law defines 
child pornography as “any visual depiction of sexually explicit 
conduct involving a minor,”53 and they are perhaps more accurately 
described as “child sexual abuse images.”54 
B. The Convictions in United States v. Cameron 
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC) houses a database of known child victims and runs a 
“CyberTipline” for entities to report suspected child pornography.  
There is a statutory duty for any organization “engaged in providing 
an electronic communication service or a remote computing service to 
the public, through a facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce” to report apparent violations of federal child pornography 
law.
55
 
On March 15, 2007, Yahoo! received an anonymous report of 
 
 49. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).  The Ferber Court also identified an 
impetus for the criminalization of child pornography to be drying up the market for child 
pornography.  Id. at 761-62 (“The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an 
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials.”).  See 
also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (one should go through levels in the distribution 
chain). 
 50. Thomas K. Clancy, Digital Child Pornography and the Fourth Amendment, THE 
UNIV. OF MISS. SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/Clancy,%20Digital%20Child%20Pornography%20and
%20the%204th%20Amendment%2007.14.10.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 628 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
2258A(a)(1) (2012)). 
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child pornography images housed in one of its user’s accounts named 
“lilhottee0000.”56  Yahoo! protocol established a series of actions 
which included removing the account, searching it, and if the search 
indicated child pornography, generating a report for the NCMEC 
CyberTipline (CP Report or CyberTipline Report) and keeping a 
receipt of the report.  On August 3, 2007, NCMEC sent a report of 
child pornography that Yahoo! had documented to the Maine State 
Police Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) unit.
57
  Later, 
NCMEC sent another report regarding another set of child 
pornography images, housed in the Yahoo! Photo account of user 
“harddude0000.”58  Both CyberTipline Reports listed the same 
Internet protocol (IP) address, 76.179.26.185, in a section of the 
report titled “Suspect Information.”59 
An ICAC detective traced the IP address to the provider Time 
Warner.
60
  Subpoenaing Time Warner, the detective determined that 
the IP address led to the Cameron residence in the relevant time 
periods.
61
  ICAC seized four computers at the Cameron residence, and 
a forensic examiner examined them in March 2008.
62
  Forensic 
examination of Cameron’s seized computers showed child 
pornography stored on two of the machines.
63
  It also showed that 
someone executed Internet searches for terms related to child 
pornography, and that someone had signed into a service (now 
defunct) called “Google Hello” and used usernames to send and 
receive child pornography.
64
  ICAC served search warrants on Yahoo! 
for activity logs related to the accounts accessed from Cameron’s 
computers, and on Google for activity logs related to the Google 
Hello account.
65
 
The data recovered by those activity logs included emails in 
which Cameron sent and received child pornography images.
66
  A 
federal grand jury indicted Cameron on sixteen counts of child 
pornography-related crimes, each of which included a specific date on 
 
 56. Id. at 627. 
 57. Id. at 629. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 629. 
 61. Id. at 629-30. 
 62. Id. at 630. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 630-31. 
 66. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 630. 
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which Cameron either sent or received child pornography.
67
  Cameron 
“contended that Yahoo! acted as an agent of the government when it 
searched password-protected accounts for child pornography before 
reporting to NCMEC,” therefore they triggered his Confrontation 
Clause rights.
68
 
The district court held that the searches were valid because 
Yahoo! voluntarily searched the accounts without direction from the 
government.
69
  Further, the district court held that so long as the 
government established that the Yahoo! records were kept in the 
ordinary course of business, they were non-testimonial and could be 
admitted as “business records” under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(6) if they were authenticated.
70
  The NCMEC reports and 
attached images were also admissible as business records, the court 
held, because NCMEC “simply forwarded information it received 
from Yahoo!, information which itself consisted of business 
records.”71 
At trial, the government introduced the Yahoo! evidence and the 
Google Hello evidence via testimony of legal assistants in the 
companies’ respective Legal Compliance Departments.  The legal 
assistants were familiar with Yahoo!’s and Google’s data retention 
practices but had no technical training.
72
  The government also 
introduced evidence related to the NCMEC CyberTipline reports 
through testimony of the executive director of NCMEC.
73
 
The First Circuit reviewed the Internet forensic data by creating 
three separate categories: (1) Internet account information and activity 
records, (2) “electronic receipts of Yahoo’s CP Reports 
to . . . produced by Yahoo! in response to search warrants,”74 and (3) 
NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports. 
1. Internet Account Information and Activity Records 
Not every business record falls within the business record 
 
 67. Id. at 630-31. 
 68. Id. at 631. 
 69. Id. at 631-32 (citing United States v. Cameron, 729 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423-24 (D. Me. 
2010) [hereinafter Cameron II]). 
 70. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 641 (citing United States v. Cameron, 733 F. Supp. 2d 182, 
188-89 (D. Me. 2010) [hereinafter Cameron III]). 
 71. Id. at 632. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 629. 
 74. Id. at 638. 
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exception to the hearsay prohibition.  The First Circuit acknowledged 
this, citing the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz as evidence.
75
  However, 
these account information and activity logs were all made at or near 
the time of the event, and created and kept in the regular course of 
business,
76
 “totally unrelated to any trial or law enforcement 
purpose.”77  Thus the court held that they were properly introduced as 
non-testimonial business records.
78
  It included the Yahoo! Account 
Management Tool, Yahoo! Login Tracker data, and Google Hello 
Connection logs.
79
 
2. Receipts of Yahoo! CP 
While the receipts of the CP reports are also business records, 
the First Circuit wrote, “there is strong evidence that the CP reports 
were prepared with the primary purpose of establishing or proving 
past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”80  
Yahoo! created these reports in response to the statutory duty to 
report apparent violations of child pornography law.
81
  They 
contained Internet records and employee notes, including hearsay 
statements by Yahoo! employees that linked the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) to the suspected child pornography.  The First Circuit 
weighed the fact that the reports were only made in response to 
suspected child pornography, that they used the term “suspect” 
repeatedly to identify Cameron, and that once created, Yahoo! sent 
the CP Report to NCMEC, knowing that NCMEC would forward 
them to law enforcement.
82
  Thus, the “objective test” of the “primary 
purpose” led the court to consider this evidence testimonial.83 
Comparing these reports to the evidence generated in Davis,
84
 
the First Circuit stated that “NCMEC effectively acted as an agent of 
law enforcement,” and concluded that “the CP reports at issue here. . 
.fall somewhere in the range between volunteered testimony and 
 
 75. Id. at 640. 
 76. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 641. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)). 
 77. Id. at 642. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 643 (citation omitted). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A)(1). 
 82. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 644. 
 83. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (statements made by a train engineer in 
earlier investigation were inadmissible hearsay at the trial that occurred after the engineer died 
because the “primary utility” of the report was “in litigating, not in railroading”). 
 84. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) 
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responses to an interrogation.”85 
3. NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports 
The Circuit Court ruled that the NCMEC CyberTipline Reports 
were also testimonial.  They were “introduced—and admitted—into 
evidence to prove the truth of the assertions contained therein, most 
importantly: that child pornography images were uploaded onto a 
particular Yahoo! account, and that the most recent one of those 
images was uploaded from a specific IP address on a specific date and 
time.”86  These reports were the link between the specific dates of 
individual criminal counts, and the accused’s IP address. 
The Court conducted a harmless error analysis and concluded 
that while some of the counts could be affirmed as based on properly 
admitted evidence, other counts relied primarily on inadmissible 
evidence and required reversal.
87
 
III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE QUESTIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 
A. How Should We Weigh Logistical Concerns? 
On the one hand, the idea that we abridge constitutional rights 
based on (in)convenience seems appalling; what’s more, the Court 
has plainly stated that the Confrontation Clause right is a “particular” 
one: “testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”88 On the other 
hand, as Justice Breyer emphasized in his Melendez-Diaz 
concurrence, in the current day requiring lab technician testimony for 
all data would create insurmountable logistical problems.
89
 
Justice Kennedy wrote that hinging prosecution on the 
practicality of requiring an FBI analyst (of which there are 500 
employees, conducting more than one million tests annually) to 
“board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse, and 
 
 85. Id. at 46.  See infra Part III.A. 
 86. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 651. 
 87. Id. at 652-53. 
 88. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S 36, 61 (2004).  The Crawford Court stated 
explicitly, “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth 
Amendment prescribes.”  Id. at 62. 
 89. Judge G. Ross Anderson Jr., a District Court Judge for the District of South Carolina, 
recently bemoaned, “[T]he decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming threaten to overwhelm 
the justice system by constantly requiring the country’s limited number of forensic analysts to 
appear at trial.”  G. Ross Anderson Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause Sanity, THE FEDERAL 
LAWYER, Mar. 2013, at 71, available at http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/march13-entire.pdf.aspx. 
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sit there waiting to read aloud notes made months ago” for each test 
would be, in practice, “a windfall to defendants” as it would surely 
result in fewer prosecutions and convictions.
90
 
Regardless of what ought to be a consideration, the proliferation 
of data makes logistical issues increasingly prominent.  The 
government has limited resources, and we are swimming in data.  
Often that data might be somewhere in middle ground, as the Yahoo! 
CP Reports were in Cameron: data assembled and lightly annotated 
with obvious notes.  In time, that stage of analysis might be executed 
by software programmed by humans but not directly by human 
analysts.  Would that change the outcome entirely?
91
 
Moreover, if the criminal justice community refuses to confront 
the logistical realities, the obvious solution for laboratories, ISPs or 
other entities that generate forensic data will be to simply produce 
unsigned reports that do not identify the technician who ran the test or 
analyst who compiled the data.
92
  Justice Alito dodged this in 
Williams when he accepted expert testimony under the shady claim 
that the expert was not testifying to the truth of the reports but on the 
hypothetical question, ‘if the report was accurate, would it match the 
defendant’s DNA?’93 
Justice Alito also wrote for the plurality that the report was not 
intended to be used as evidence against the defendant, so there was no 
right of confrontation involved.
94
  In distinguishing the “formality” 
(and therefore testimonial nature) of the Yahoo! receipts of the reports 
it sent to NCMEC from the Cellmark DNA results in Williams, the 
First Circuit cited the Williams plurality: “the technicians who prepare 
a DNA profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will turn 
out to be incriminating or exonerating—or both.”95  In contrast, 
 
 90. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343. 
 91. See Karen Neville, Programmers and Forensic Analyses: Accusers Under the 
Confrontation Clause, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 18 (2011) (Neville identifies the potential for 
fraud and error in forensic lab tests and the weaknesses in analyst testimony, and advocates 
requiring the programmer to testify, as “[T]he programmer [is] the true accuser—not the 
machine merely following the protocols he created”). 
 92. As Justice Kagan wrote in her Williams dissent, “The prosecution could avoid its 
demands by using the right kind of forms with the right kind of language. (It would not take 
long to devise the magic words and rules—principally, never call anything a ‘certificate.’)”  
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2276 (2012).  Moreover, “The new conventions, precisely 
by making out-of-court statements less ‘solem[n],’ would also make them less reliable—and so 
turn the Confrontation Clause upside down.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. at 2223-24. 
 94. Id. at 2226. 
 95. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 647 (quoting Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244). 
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“[n]obody at Yahoo! who was involved in creating the CP Reports 
could possibly have believed the CP Reports could be other than 
incriminating.”96  This distinction seems dubious. 
To begin, the DNA test would not arrive at a lab if there were 
not a suspicion, which is to say, a real possibility that the DNA 
evidence would be incriminating.  Additionally, the DNA report was 
generated by a laboratory that fulfills government forensic lab work; 
Cellmark might not be “an agent of law enforcement” in every 
context, but it was certainly an agent of the government here.
97
  
Finally, as the facts played out, the DNA report was incriminating; 
presumably the prosecution would not have sought to use it if it had 
not been.  There may be valid reasons to explain a court’s decision to 
find DNA evidence not to require cross-examination, but the idea that 
it is not linked directly enough to the production of incriminating 
evidence does not seem viable. 
B. Is a Surrogate Witness Sufficient? 
Much more credible might be the contention that there are 
logistical hurdles to producing the particular lab technician who 
generated the lab results.  This, of course, is also the root of the 
questions about “surrogate” witnesses or expert witnesses that 
effectively, if not legally, stand in.
98
  If it were easy to produce the 
technician who created the lab reports, there would need be no 
discussion of surrogates. 
Yet the Court has explicitly rejected the concept of a “surrogate” 
witness.
99
  While there may be varying definitions as to what 
constitutes a “surrogate” witness, I reject the notion generally because 
the Supreme Court made clear that the Confrontation Clause is “a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”100  Thus either there 
is a Confrontation Clause requirement present or there is not; to my 
mind, there can be no faithfully constitutional “surrogate witness.”  
(Note that the Court’s reasoning in Williams for accepting expert 
witness’ testimony hinged on the inadmissibility of the underlying 
testimonial evidence; it did not recognize the idea of surrogate 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. 
 98. See FED. R. EVID. 703 for rules on expert witnesses. 
 99. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
 100. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).  It “commands, not that the 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.”  Id.; see generally Mnookin, supra note 32. 
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witnessing.
101
) 
Rather than a viable legal proposition, the notion of a surrogate 
witness seems to be a reaction to the logistical realities that now 
confront Sixth Amendment applications.
102
  I recognize these 
logistical realities and suggest that we have the conversation outright 
about what we aim to accomplish in guaranteeing a right to confront 
witnesses, and what the limitations of our system mean for that right.  
It is a question that digital evidence will only exacerbate, as we 
collect and retain drastically more data, and rely more heavily upon 
intelligent Internet-based analysis systems to process that data.  
Criminal forensic evidence just isn’t what it used to be. 
C. Is the Confrontation Clause Insulation Against Error, or Is It 
Something Else? 
The Melendez-Diaz holding was penned by an originalist,
103
 and 
yet it seems that the holding in Melendez-Diaz may have been 
motivated more by the broad pursuit of the trappings of justice than 
textualist adherence to a process-focused constitutional right.  If a lab 
technician’s signature does not trigger the requirement of a lab 
technician’s testimony, lab reports might simply venture 
unaccompanied into a court room.  As such, while there may not be 
much value in cross-examining a lab technician who may or may not 
recall pressing the button on a particular set of samples, the Court has 
leaned toward requiring the technician to testify (and it then employed 
the “expert witness” dodge in Williams). 
Justice Scalia voiced concern that “[f]orensic evidence is not 
uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”104  While true, it is 
not clear that a ‘witness’s testimony immunizes forensic evidence 
from the risks of manipulation or error, either.  It is especially unclear 
what is added in the way of verifiability or truthfulness if the witness 
is a member of the Google legal department who never had a 
technical understanding of the process nor participated in the 
 
 101. Williams, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2222. 
 102. Even those who recognize “surrogate witnesses” as though they are a real alternative 
in the confrontation clause context seem to do so in tacit or explicit acknowledgement that it is a 
reaction to logistical constraints.  See, e.g., Nicholas Klaiber, Confronting Reality: Surrogate 
Forensic Science Witnesses Under the Confrontation Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 199 (2011). 
 103. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Thomson West, 2012). 
 104. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. 
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collection or retention of the data.
105
  By the same token, it is not 
particularly clear that it would be useful to call in the computer 
scientist who can testify to the process by which he developed a 
computer program to operate, but has no specific knowledge of how it 
may have been used by a defendant for a particular crime. 
Before Crawford, the Court considered the need for 
Confrontation Clause rights in terms of how reliable the evidence 
was.  This meant that the exceptions were instances in which the 
Court found that certain “statements were so inherently reliable that 
cross-examination would have been superfluous”106  It also meant that 
the Court explicitly held that Confrontation Clause rights had a 
“truthfinding function.”107  This function undergirded the right—
witnesses were there to provide more information to the jury and 
those witnesses that were to be called were to be those that knew 
something about the crime. 
It is significant that the Confrontation Clause was conceived at a 
time when testimonial evidence against an accused consisted of 
human testimony; requiring that same human to appear in court might 
reasonably lead to guarantees of trustworthiness that went to the truth 
of their accusations.  (This is presumably why “demeanor of the 
witness”108 is one value the Court found to be conferred by the 
confrontation right.)  In the case of digital evidence that did not 
originate with human authorship, the value of having a human testify 
to verify hearsay that she did not create is not as easy to track.  
Moreover, the Court no longer includes determinations of reliability 
in evidence to be part of the reason for calling a witness anyway.
109
 
The Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that a lab 
technician still must submit to cross-examination to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause seems to show intent to preserve the 
Confrontation Clause as a procedural right.  The procedural right to 
confront one’s accuser makes sense on a human level, especially 
when the person’s freedom is at stake; the idea of depriving liberty 
 
 105. As one scholar observed, “If physical presence alone truly meets the standard then the 
reinvigorated Confrontation Clause has reach but no force.”  Lisa K. Griffin, Circling Around 
the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but Not a Robust Right, MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS, 2006, at 16, 21, http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/circling-around-the-
confrontation-clause. 
 106. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999). 
 107. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968). 
 108. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
 109. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
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without affording opportunity for confrontation is disturbing.
110
  The 
pre-Crawford Court acknowledged this intuitive aspect and described 
its “ancient origins that pre-date the hearsay rule.”111  This procedural 
rationale holds meaning because it exists in tandem with the truth-
verification purpose of the witness.  We do not call witnesses for an 
empty procedural dance, even if the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
confrontation and not verification.  (In this, it resembles other 
procedural rights—not every witness will contribute meaningfully to 
the truth-finding mission of a trial, but there is a guarantee to the basic 
right of confrontation—and “[t]he Constitution entitles a criminal 
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”112). 
Witnesses who take the stand merely to recite company policy or 
generalized probabilities of error seem unlikely to impact 
meaningfully the credibility of the evidence presented.  When we as 
criminal justice practitioners call in witnesses merely for satisfaction 
of our own nagging consciences but without a good-faith expectation 
of information that may contribute to exonerate or incriminate, does 
not the Confrontation Clause look a ritualistic dance performed to sate 
the judiciary’s desire for some trappings of justice in the system, even 
if the trappings are hollow?
113
 
 
 110. The Confrontation Clause does not apply to civil cases, or to preliminary hearings 
(though hearsay statements in preliminary hearings would not be admissible at trial without the 
opportunity for testimony and cross-examination of the witness).  See Barber, 390 U.S. at 725 
(“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-
examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness.”). 
 111. The Court wrote in Lilly v. Virginia, “The Court’s effort to tie the Clause so directly 
to the hearsay rule is of fairly recent vintage, compare Roberts . . . with California v. Green, 
while the Confrontation Clause itself has ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule.”  Lilly v. 
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 at 140 (citation omitted). In many of the Court’s earlier opinions, the 
Court wrote from the foundational assumption that the Confrontation Clause is rooted in 
principles older than the U.S. Constitution and derives its hearsay exceptions from principles of 
justice. For instance, in 1898, the Court wrote in Reynolds v. United States that the forfeiture 
rule “has its foundation in the [equitable] maxim that no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong.”  98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).  The Court noted that “this long-
established usage . . . has rarely been departed from” and is an “outgrowth of a maxim based on 
the principles of common honesty.”  Id. 
 112. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
 113. In Williams v. Illinois, Justice Thomas proposed “limited application [of the clause] to 
a narrow class of statements bearing indicia of solemnity,” which did not include the Cellmark 
DNA report at issue.  132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Precisely because 
limited application lends itself to runarounds from the prosecution, Justice Kagan responded in 
her dissent that this “would turn the Confrontation Clause into a constitutional geegaw—nice for 
show, but of little value.” Id. at 2276. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND WHY THIS MATTERS 
A. What’s at Stake? 
As I have shown, there are snags at many different levels when 
applying the Confrontation Clause to digital forensic evidence.  I have 
taken child pornography prosecution as a case study, but these 
impediments apply to evidence surrounding other cyber crimes, and 
to Internet evidence in kinetic world crime.  Moreover, because other 
constitutional rights are intertwined with Fourth Amendment 
determinations, our confused case law concerning digital forensic 
data can continue to reverberate in other contexts for the future. 
For instance, the Fourth Amendment revolves around a 
“reasonableness” standard for privacy. While judges educate 
themselves on digital technology, practices such as Internet 
vigilantism could affect our future expectations of privacy in digital 
data.
114
  Companies’ data policies are delineating our expectations and 
defining what evidence is available and in what context.  Google 
reported in its latest “Transparency Report”115 that U.S. agencies 
made 8438 requests in the six-month period ending December 2012, 
regarding 14,791 accounts.  In keeping with Google’s stated policy, 
the company provides envelope information without probable cause, 
including the IP address where a Gmail account was created and 
email headers such as “to,” “from” and “date” fields.116  Because 
Internet crime is conducted on a landscape of privately-owned cyber 
property, from domains to ISPs to cloud storage, the data policies that 
companies adopt will continue to shape our expectations for what 
Internet evidence is available and what is not. 
The way in which we treat digital forensic data will also resonate 
in the scope of the First Amendment.  For instance, Cameron cited 
 
 114. This is especially likely in the case of crimes like child pornography where the 
Internet community has a strong urge to self-regulate.  In October 2011, prominent hacker group 
Anonymous announced the launch of “Operation DarkNet,” in which it took down a server 
hosting 40 child pornography sites and published the names of more than 1500 people who 
visited “Lolita City,” the largest of the sites, which according to Anonymous contained more 
than 100GB of child pornography.  Press Release, Anonymous, OpDarkNet (Oct. 15, 2011), 
available at http://pastebin.com/T1LHnzEW.  Recall Anonymous’ enactment in 2007 of the first 
instance of Internet vigilantism toward pedophiles, leading to the Chris Forcand arrest. See 
Chris Forcand, ENCYCLOPEDIA DRAMATICA, https://encyclopediadramatica.es/Chris_forcand 
(last modified Sept. 29, 2013). 
 115. Transparency Report: User Data Requests, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 116. David Kravets, Yahoo, Like Google, Demands Warrants for User E-mail, WIRED, 
Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/yahoo-demands-warrants/. 
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United States v. Jackson
117
 in his motion to federal district court.  In 
Jackson the Seventh Circuit had rejected the contention that Website 
content constituted business records of the ISPs.
118
  The Cameron 
district court rejected Cameron’s Jackson claim with the statement, 
“the images are not hearsay to begin with . . . Jackson’s holding, 
which affected postings—statements—on websites, does not extend 
to images.”119  The First Circuit Cameron opinion never addressed 
Jackson or the district court’s reasoning, but it is a useful prompt to 
consider the dimensions of Internet data as speech. 
B. The Need for a New Dialogue 
I have argued in previous work that Internet violence is not 
correctly conceived as a mere extension of kinetic world violence, but 
is a manifestation of the particular characteristics and vulnerabilities 
in our lives as Internet citizens.
120
  Similarly, I find that the 
application online of evidentiary standards developed for kinetic 
world crime can lead to frustrated situations that are far from the 
justice that we seek. 
For example, whereas child pornography distribution has long 
been criminalized for a variety of philosophical reasons, the 
determination to treat as a distinct criminal act each shared file as an 
instance of distribution and each stored image as an act of possession 
seems inappropriate in the Internet age of file-sharing applications.  It 
is unwieldy and leads to distorted outcomes.  (It is also inefficient to 
the extent that distribution prosecution requires the government to 
navigate a showing of intent to distribute; intent is inherently difficult 
to show in file-sharing, particularly when the accused is not a 
sophisticated computer user and given that many file-sharing 
applications have a default setting to share). 
 
 117. United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 118. The court held: 
The fact that the Internet service providers may be able to retrieve information 
that its customers posted or email that its customers sent does not turn that 
material into a business record of the Internet service provider.  Any evidence 
procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most 
liberal interpretations of the hearsay exception rules. 
Id. at 637.  See Susan Brenner, Child Pornography Was Not Hearsay, CYB3RCRIM3 (Feb. 4, 
2011, 9:43 AM) http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2011/02/child-pornography-was-not-
hearsay.html. 
 119. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D. Me. 2011). 
 120. See Merritt Baer, Cyberstalking, and the Internet Landscape We Have Constructed, 
15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 154 (2010). 
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This in turn leads to problematic sentencing.  Warranted societal 
revulsion at the sexual victimization of children leads to political 
tendency to continually strengthen sentences; also, there has been 
insufficient revision to the sentencing guidelines to reflect Internet as 
the forum for non-production child pornography crimes.  
Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in extreme sentencing for non-
production child pornography offenses.
121
 
The United States Sentencing Commission released a recent 
report on child pornography sentencing
122
 in which it characterized 
the existing child pornography sentencing structure as “in need of 
revision.”123 This is because “most of the enhancements in 
2G2.2 . . . were promulgated when the typical offender obtained child 
pornography in printed form in the mail.”  Problematic sentencing in 
cyber crime often can be traced to policies that are not well-suited to 
Internet as a forum.  The Sentencing Commission elaborated: 
[A]s a result of recent changes in the computer and Internet 
technologies that typical non-production offenders use, the existing 
sentencing scheme in non-production cases no longer adequately 
distinguishes among offenders based on their degrees of 
culpability. Non-production child pornography offenses have 
become almost exclusively Internet-enabled crimes; the typical 
offender today uses modern Internet-based technologies such as 
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing programs. . . . The typical 
offender’s collection not only has grown in volume but also 
contains a wide variety of graphic sexual images (including images 
of very young victims), which are now readily available on the 
 
 121. Child pornography sentencing is found at U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 2G2.1 and 
2G2.2.  See Current Versions of the Primary Child Pornography Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, Feb. 2013, app. B, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/Appendix_B.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 122. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/. 
 123. Id.  at i-xxvi, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/Executive_Summary.pdf.  
The Commission identified factors that prompted their examination of these laws: (1) child 
pornography cases are increasing; (2) judges are increasingly departing from the applicable 
guidelines in non-production cases in the years since the sentencing guidelines became 
“effectively advisory” in 2006; (3) the guidelines do not account for the use of Internet and file-
sharing in particular; and finally, social science and other criminal justice system stakeholders 
consider the sentencing mode outdated.  Id. at ii-iii. 
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Internet. 
As a result, four of the of six sentencing enhancements in 
2G2.2—those relating to computer usage and the type and volume 
of images possessed by offenders, which together account for 13 
offense levels—now apply to most offenders and, thus, fail to 
differentiate among offenders in terms of their culpability.
124
 
As a result of distorted outcomes, the Commission found that 
judges are frequently choosing to depart from the sentencing 
guidelines in child pornography cases.
125
  This, of course, undermines 
the basic standardization purpose of sentencing guidelines.
126
 
It is not merely child pornography prosecutions and sentencing 
that will benefit from a broader reconsideration of the form and 
function of the Confrontation Clause.  It raises general concerns as to 
the constitutional consequences when courts refuse to conceive of 
criminal justice rights and remedies in the context of emerging 
technologies.  We ought to be concerned by allegiance to textualism 
that results in a shrouded version of judicial activism, and often yields 
bizarre or nonsensical results because it attempts to place eighteenth-
century process upon twenty-first-century situations.  There is no 
coherent “originalist” version of digital forensic evidence witnesses; 
one does not absolve oneself of interpretive decision-making by 
hinging it on dictionary definitions or one’s imagined version of 
eighteenth-century intent.
127
 
 
 124. Id. at iii. 
 125. See id.  “The average minimum of guideline ranges in non-production child 
pornography offenses in fiscal year 2004 was 50.1 months, and the average sentence imposed 
was 53.7 months; by fiscal year 2010, the average guideline minimum was 117.5 months, and 
the average sentence imposed was 95.0 months.”  See id. at n. 10. 
 126. See Pete Yost, Study: Sentencing in Child Porn Cases Uneven, THE WASH. POST, 
Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/study-sentencing-in-child-porn-cases-
uneven/2013/02/28/a97082b0-813e-11e2-a350-49866afab584_story.html. 
 127. Justice Souter made this point in his Harvard 2010 Commencement speech: 
[T]he fair reading model has only a tenuous connection to reality . . . So much for 
the notion that all of constitutional law lies there in the Constitution waiting for a 
judge to read it fairly . . . the very opportunity for conflict between one high 
value and another reflects our confidence that a way may be found to resolve it 
when a conflict arises.  That is why the simplistic view of the Constitution 
devalues our aspirations, and attacks that our confidence, and diminishes us. 
Justice David H. Souter, Remarks at Harvard’s 359th Commencement, (May 27, 2010), in  
HARVARD GAZETTE, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-
souters-speech/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).  See also Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of 
Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2012,  available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-
the-law-textual-originalism# (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
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Whereas the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause is a 
particular right to confront the particular witness, in the case of child 
pornography it is not clear whom that witness is.  The Crawford 
decision’s emphasis upon the Confrontation Clause as a procedural 
right only exacerbates the inelasticity of applying it to new forms of 
media.  And (provided that general best practices in forensics and 
rates of data error are available to introduce the average possibility of 
error), if the proper witness in child pornography prosecution is the 
forensic lab tech who printed out computer data, it is unclear what the 
benefit of that opportunity to cross-examine will be, other than to 
provide a logistical hurdle for the prosecution. 
As we adjust to new manifestations of our selves online, we need 
to adjust to new manifestations of Internet crime and criminal justice 
responses.  I do not suggest that the Confrontation Clause is 
irrelevant; I do, however, advocate for a coherent version of it for the 
digital world in which we use digital evidence.  My impulse is 
conservative; I seek to conserve the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment.  I suggest that we begin to have a functional 
conversation about what the Confrontation Clause right means in 
context, without which we may end up losing the essential 
preservation of justice for which it was written. 
 
